An Absolute Masterpiece of the Era of the Professional Adventurer and Soldier….Plainly Stated….THE BLEED

Several years ago while reading the writings of Robin Moore, the author of the classic book The Green Berets, I discovered that he had spent two years in Rhodesia, a small African country, running an unofficial American embassy that catered particularly to Americans who had joined the Rhodesian Army in their battle against the tide of Communism in Southern Africa.

I began to remember old Soldier of Fortune Magazines that had written about ‘Mercs’ fighting for this country. Needless to say, I was intrigued and wondered who these men were, these ‘The Crippled Eagles’.

I scoured the internet and Amazon to find any reading material that would give me more information on these men. Most of whom were veterans of the Vietnam War that continued the profession of War Time soldiering and the battle against the Red Tide. Very little was available at that time. Thankfully, I found bits and pieces that would lead me on to another clue, another person to contact or another book to read.

Book Review: The Bleed by John Cronin

It seemed that these men were quiet. The ones who were very loud and vocal, adding Mercenary/Rhodesia/Selous Scouts to their CV were often frauds. It was easy even five years ago to imagine your past and add in some manly ‘Merc’ activity to it, simply because resource material was scarce to verify a persons claims.

As I began to home in on legitimate pieces of information, certain names kept appearing and John Cronin was one of them. I keep a list of people that I hope to come across in order to possibly get their stories or information on the war. It turned out that the best information came from the burgeoning online community of Rhodesian War veterans. Their history and story is an understudied segment of military history that deserves to be up there with any of the great Special Operations units of the world.

Some I made contact with on Facebook, others through email. The Rhodesians themselves had opinions on Yanks who made it over to participate in the war. There were either good men or shitbags. Most of the Yanks who went over either excelled as members of the Rhodesian Army or deserted. There may have been 300 or so that went over but far less distinguished themselves. John Cronin is solid.


The Tempestuous Travels of an American Cold Warrior

The search for Captain Cronin had turned up a dry hole so I was extremely excited to see a book simply appear on Amazon’s recommendations for my account. Called The Bleed, I immediately downloaded it and devoured it. This book is a classic autobiography that fills in so many missing links about the few that served in Vietnam and then Rhodesia. Whether you are interested in Rhodesia or not, anyone remotely interested in Special Operations and the lifestyle of a Professional Soldier from the Baby Boom generation will enjoy this read.

Cronin’s family had served with distinction in combat through all of the major wars America has participated in and he was to be no exception. In the mid 1960s and the ramping up of forces in Vietnam, he enrolled at the Virginia Military Institute for his college education. Circumstance and his easy going style forced him to make other decisions a year later.

Not wanting to come back from the Vietnam War in a body bag, he weighed his options and enlisted in the Marine Corps because he felt at that time they were a more motivated, well trained force. Anyone who joined the military in 1966 knew that they were most likely to spend a year abroad in Vietnam, backpack and all. The Author describes a classic path through Marine Corps boot camp ending up with orders to become a radio man. Unlike today, people rarely chose their career path. Dutifully completing the school, he had no intention of sitting behind a desk for the 13 month tour of duty.

Vietnam is full of stories of chance and circumstance of people simply raising their hand and ending up in units that today would require an extremely long selection and pipeline to enter into. 1st Marine Battalion Recon had an opening and off he went. Arriving at the unit, again he finds a way into the bush, and starts operating with elite Marines in the thick of the action along the DMZ.

After a few months of extended recces and surprise contacts with the NVA and VC, the odds caught up with him and he was badly wounded. The author’s humor and perspective come through along with detailed and gripping action. Extracted off the battlefield, he enters recovery, assessing his future. Most would have taken the Purple Heart and finished their time and went back to normal life, figuring that they had done their bit.

After a battle with bureaucracy he made it back and this time he raised his hand for 3rd Force Recon doing God’s work along the DMZ. Quite frankly, with the material that Captain Cronin presented to this point is enough for a book in and of itself. After leaving the Marines, he finished college and felt the desire to gain a commission back in the Corps. His tour of duty as an Infantry Officer in a post-Vietnam era was uneventful, except of course for his love life, which adds to the narrative wherever he went, but it prepared him for the next war that he would choose to fight.

Deciding to test himself further as a Warrior he heads for Rhodesia with a one way ticket and is whisked away to recruiters who examine his history and welcome him aboard. This was a time when Rhodesia was in serious need of manpower. They gave him the choice of either the Rhodesian Light Infantry or the SAS, and he chose the RLI. I personally questioned the Author as to why he made this choice over the SAS, given his Force Recon experience. Trained as an Infantry Officer, he felt that he wanted to utilize his training and meet the enemy in head to head action but he would eventually finish his service in Rhodesia as one of five Americans to have served in the Selous Scouts.

Given a slot straightway into the RLI, he goes about proving himself as a capable officer and tells the story from a unique perspective. He pulls no punches on Rhodesian politics as well as the ‘Freedom Fighters’ of ZANU and ZIPRA. Woven into this time in the RLI is his relationship with a female member of the Army and it is an interesting story of two people living and fighting a war and how it affected their lives.

Cronin’s reputation and skill as a RLI Officer is solid as verified by many Rhodesians I have spoken to. His abilities as an Officer grew within the Rhodesian way of war to the point that he was running Fire Force mission from the sky in the K-Car. Anything less than competency would lead to disgrace and duty elsewhere, likely in the mess hall or an adjutant to a motor pool officer of higher rankl

One last thing remained on his bucket list as a Professional Soldier. The Selous Scouts. Known worldwide as one of the most effective counter insurgency forces in history, it is a challenge that he cannot live without. This reader’s understanding of the Scouts was enhanced by reading these chapters.

As Mugabe took power, John Cronin at the age of 32 decided to move on with his life. His interest in foreign affairs, the Middle East and Africa in particular, caused him to pursue graduate studies. Most of us would try to compete for places in the Ivy League schools of the US and perhaps make trips to our region of interest.

Not so for the Author.

He heads for the American University in Cairo and then for study in Beirut, Lebanon. Yes, that place where there was a civil war going on and hundreds of Marines were blown up in one of America’s first tastes of terrorism. As a blonde haired American in a city that hated the West, he was bound for trouble in the form of a kidnapping by Hezbollah. It is harrowing and unhinged but Captain Cronin obviously lived to tell about it – barely.

As a student of the Marine Corps in Vietnam and the Rhodesian Bush War, I found a book that linked them together in a narrative that I have found nowhere else. The Americans who did this are very few in number. Some never made it home and others are nowhere to be found. It’s not just the subject matter that makes this book worth reading; it is the Author’s ability to bring you along for the adventure that causes me to write a review for all readers of SOFREP and military history. It saves us from the pretense that a man of his experience might throw at a reader.

This book is worth far more than the 4.99 I paid for it. In fact, as a researcher, it is priceless. The genuine genius behind it is that you need not be historically ‘informed’ nor even be interested in the wars that are covered. This is the Odyssey of a Professional Soldier in the 20th Century.

Do yourself or someone you know favor by reading this important story ! Then by all means share your thoughts and comments as all are appreciated. To thine own self be TRUE! All the Best!
https://a.co/d/agG4LFr

Four Ball, One Tracer: An interview with Author and Professional Soldier Roelf Van Heerden

Originally published on SOFREP.com



The continent of Africa in the 1990s was a cauldron of warlords, failed states, and genocide. From the Rwandan genocide in the east to the decades-long civil war in Angola in the west, to the changes in post-apartheid government of South Africa, people were dying, dictators oppressed their own people, and the continent cried out for solutions.

The world’s first reaction was to send in the blue helmets of the United Nations, which normally brought a trail of bureaucracy, illicit trade, and impotency. Opportunists of all sorts, from arms manufacturers to dealers in blood diamonds, sought to profit off the immoral killing and plundering of the common villager. Instability reigned supreme.

Those soldiers and militaries from the U.N. fared poorly in their attempts to intervene and advise in these conflict zones, much less to “keep the peace.” Those soldiers from the nation of South Africa who had come through 20-plus years of fighting in familiar terrain and climate conditions, and against familiar hostile combatants, knew that to bring certain conflicts under control required African soldiers.


Enter Executive Outcomes. EO has come to represent nearly everything both good and bad about private military companies. Yet the true story is known by very few. Many journalists still mistakenly believe and print that it still exists. Other charlatans with no association with the PMC have used the name to start businesses or claimed to have worked in the conflicts associated with EO, attempting to gain employment or company contracts.

Eeben Barlow has published a book chronicling EO’s inception, contracts, and closure in his book “Against All Odds.” He tells the story from the founder and CEO’s position. It is a fascinating true story. Movies have been made, novels published, and recently, even a graphic novel has been published claiming to tell their story. Colonel (ret.) Roelf Van Heerden takes us inside the operations in Angola and Sierra Leone in his book “Four Ball One Tracer: Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone.”

Colonel Van Heerden has soldiered for more than 40 years on the continent of Africa. In his book, he takes us through his military history and quickly paces us into the recruitment, clandestine travel, and initial landings in Angola through to EO’s final mission dismantling the RUF.

International powers that be and the U.N. were afraid of EO’s incredible performance with a minimum of personnel, equipment, and time. They put pressure on Sierra Leone and other countries to end any associations or contracts with Executive Outcomes using threats and intimidation to end world support for embattled nations. There would be no monetary loans or military assistance if they continued to allow these ‘white mercenaries’ to work and protect their nations.

Colonel Van Heerden was gracious enough to allow me to interview him about his long and storied career, which continues on today: He’s now working counter-piracy missions around the Horn of Africa. He commanded the effective release of the crew of ICEBERG 1 after 32 months of captivity, and he continues his work ‘somewhere’ in that part of the world. For more on his life story, check out his book, “Four Ball One Tracer” (it is available on Amazon in paper or a very affordable Kindle edition). Whether you are a serious student of irregular warfare in Africa or simply want to understand how the first modern private military company operated and won conflicts, this book is without equal.

He tells his story without apologies, fanfare, or any hint of vain glory as the ground commander leading his troops into battle against some of Africa’s most heinous combatants. Invest your time in this fascinating story.


SOFREP: Colonel Van Heerden, you have written the book “Four Ball One Tracer” about your time with Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone. You began with EO as a platoon sergeant in spite of having been a full colonel in the South African Army. Can you describe your experience in the SADF?

VH: As stated in my book, I have had a stock standard military life. From both my parents I have military grandfathers and uncles who have fought on both sides of the fence, either for or against the British (Anglo-Boer War) and in WWI and WWII. One of my uncles was a fighter pilot for the RAF and was shot down three weeks prior to the end of the war by young German soldiers operating an AA gun.

Having done 12 months of National Service training, I tried my hand at mining engineering on the gold fields of South Africa, but found it to be boring and went back to join the permanent force (SADF) in 1978.

As a young servicemen at the Officers’ Training College in Heidelberg, South Africa, I was fortunate to become an officer, and I was posted to Walvis Bay in Namibia for the remainder of my National Service period. I did like the synergy found amongst young officers, and that drove me for the rest of my life.

As an officer in SWATF (South West African Territorial Forces), I was driven by the passion of closing the gap between the level officers used to have and the troops by joining them as far as I was permitted. I made it my duty to go on patrol with my troops and battle with the enemy the way the ground troops used to experience this. My four years at 102 Battalion with the Himba tribe in the Kaokoland was a very pleasant experience. This period gave me a considerable advantage in working with different cultures, which was one of the elements of my success in working in Africa. I understood their mentality and learned to use it to the full capacity.

The following military experiences (as a mechanized infantry soldier) gave me a further benchmark to lean on in the years to come, with specific mentioning of Angola. As the staff officer operations (SO-ops) at 82 Mechanized Brigade, I obtained valuable knowledge in planning and commanding armored battalions. This phase of conventional warfare was peaked with the Staff Officers Course at Army College in Pretoria.

During my last few years in the SADF, I served with the CCB (Civil Co-Operation Bureau) and with DCC (Directorate Covert Collection)—both very sensitive and politically orientated and steered. The CCB was part of the special forces under the Chief of Defense Force, and the DCC was a directorate under Chief Staff Intelligence. In both cases I was extremely fortunate in being part of those teams, and that rounded off my illustrious military career.

Soon afterward, I was part and parcel of a “selling-off” program in reducing the covert abilities of the SADF. During the above years as a (PF) permanent force officer, I had numerous battles with the then enemy (SWAPO) in both the unconventional and conventional forces.

SOFREP: Once operations against UNITA began to come together, especially after the initial operation in Soyo, a lot of men went home on a plane. Do you think people were misinformed about their jobs awaiting them, or did experience in combat have a lot to do with who stayed and who went?

VH: Like with this type of security contract work, there are always misunderstandings about what the work entails. “When the going get tough, the tough get going,” the saying goes. But I have to mention the following: We were all in the picture from the start (we had a cover story, but at some stage, reality also starts in), but the Soyo operation was and still is “madness.” A typical heli-born operation turned into full-scale conventional (staying in the trenches) operation with a high rate of casualties, turning it into hell. For some of the chaps, this was not the way they really wanted to continue, with specific reference to the way we were supported by the FAA (Forças Armadas Angolanas). In Africa, they would rather run away, hopefully to come back tomorrow. This would have left us with ourselves. The “escape” plan was straightforward: Swim for your life until you reach one of the floating buoys in the sea.

Yes, the most experienced were staying behind.

Roelf and Brigadier General Pepe de Castro in consultation prioer to an attack on Cafunfu, Angola.

SOFREP: People often get a misconception about larger-than-life historical events. EO suffered some losses early on. Some of your former recces were a part of a rapid deployment force and were lost or wounded in early harassment contacts. Were there any other lessons for the young company apart from that?

VH: Yes, we soon learned that the best way to support your men is to remain as a “non-integrated force” and fight on your own axis of advance. This is not possible at all times, but plan toward that. Yes, train the host force to become better soldiers, but first win the fight—at least that was what needed to be done at Soyo.

SOFREP: Another misconception among readers is that you as a PMC fought all of these battles against UNITA and the RUF alone. You trained and worked with existing armies in these countries, correct?

VH: You must read this question with the previous one. Remember, there is a difference in culture in battles, and it is not possible to throw them together on one axis of advance. If you have time at hand, you can train them to do these in conjunction, but it remains a very difficult task. In Angola, I and Brig. Gen. Pepe De Castro had differences, but eventually we took turns at leading the battle. This brought about a healthy competition among fighting groups. This method needs proper commanding and good officers.

In Sierra Leone we kept the different, non-integrated ways of fighting. Although we trained them for months on end and had some battles as a joint force, we preferred to keep separated forces. Here, we were doing mainly heli-ops and using support weapons in the support role. Indirect fire was not part of the wars we experienced in Sierra Leone, and we kept that close to our chest.

The same went for the pilots flying in our battles. The SADF pilots were among the finest in the world, and our culture of using helicopters in the close support role was unique to our needs.

SOFREP: Even though you worked as advisors and trainers, you were up on line with the troops you trained. You mention that, in the SADF, being in the rear instead of in among your men was frowned upon. Can you expand on that?

VH: Yes, during my battles in both Angola and Sierra Leone, I found it to be best in being very close to the front troops. If you don’t lead, being up front, your chances are less for making progress. However, this is extremely dangerous: You are more likely to go home in a bag. This is how we had early losses at Soyo. Our men had been caught in a crossfire from own troops and the Angolans (FAA ) from behind.

SOFREP: Once you gained an objective such as a town, you engaged the locals and let them know you were here to set things right. How important do you think that was?

VH: From the start, we made them part of the plan. Secondly, they know the area, and by using them, we gained early successes.

SOFREP: Given your constraints, including manpower and equipment, do you believe that new tactics and strategy were developed during these campaigns?

VH: Yes, operating in different countries with totally different climates and terrain, you very quickly have to look at what is the best method of reaching the tactical objectives.

SOFREP: You have not written about your work after Executive Outcomes, but I understand you have done work near the Horn of Africa?

VH: Yes, I had been the operations manager at PMPF. (The Puntland Maritime Police Force.)

SOFREP: Piracy was on the radar of the world media for quite a while—even Hollywood made a movie about the Maersk Alabama. Do you feel that any long-term work has been accomplished in maritime security?

VH: When I arrived in Puntland, we had serious constraints. The U.N. Security Council did not accept PMPF as a legitimate organization. What a pity. The Puntland government is legitimate and donations from the UAE made it possible to try and stop this piracy issue, which cost the world big-time money. Secondly, the way PMPF was doing it was the only way that was cost-effective and operationally effective. Billions were spent to do it at sea. The correct and most effective way was from land. All piracy originates from land. I believe that there was never a proper appreciation done on strategic level—who and what brought it about and how these cartels were being established. The truth is that the cartels were being run by individuals. Businesslike, they have their investors who supply the cash to “babysit” the hostages and ships until ransom is paid, and then the investors are paid back double the amount invested. The logistics are run from land. Local shops are supporting whatever is needed: food, clothing, “khat,” and fuel. Even alcohol and prostitutes are on the menu.

All that needs to be done is to cut the logistics, and that needs to be done on land. That is the head of the snake.

If you asked me about any long-term work being done, my answer is no. It will surface again. It has gone “low profile” on the Somali coast, but it is not dead. NATO can run this operation much more cheaply if they assist smaller organizations like the PMPF. I had a meeting with them (through the Puntland Maritime Minister in 2013) and they refused to talk to me. I believe PMPF had been branded as a “no-no” by the U.N. Security Council and NATO.

SOFREP: Is it true that you were involved in bringing about the release of Iceberg 1? The Puntland Maritime Police have taken credit for the release. Are you able to tell us anything about ongoing work that you do in this area?

VH: Yes, during that time PMPF were isolated from their funders (UAE) and left behind while we were on the verge of catching Issi Yule, the pirate mogul then in Puntland. The management and operational core of PMPF was sent home with the exception of nine South Africans (me included). I was then ordered by the president, Mohamed Farole, to go to Garaad (where the Iceberg 1 was kept hostage for 32 months) and see what we could do to free the hostages. It took me and Admiral Abdurizak a full 13 days to free them by imposing various levels/stages of pressure (to keep the hostages alive). A very interesting operation.

SOFREP: After 40-plus years at the sharp end of the spear, is there anything you would like to say or let people know?

VH: In short, there is a definite role for PMC-type forces, and they should be taken into account, as they are very cost-effective in solving problems that could pose serious strategic and political issues for major countries. What EO did was provide a definite direction for future PMC companies. It should not be seen as a trend or a threat, but rather a solution to world security. Instead of managing these PMCs, they are being ignored and not utilized. EO worked for legitimate governments. Some of those governments were not paid attention to until EO arrived on the scene. Then EO got banned and was asked to leave the country. It does not make sense. I do understand the political sensitivity about EO, but it should be addressed properly as part of the solution.

SOFREP: Our readers are interested in not only military special operations, but also the world of intelligence and private military companies. Since 9/11, Blackwater has become synonymous with PMCs, but prior to that, Africa was host to many conflicts and counter-insurgencies. Executive Outcomes was the first major PMC to work with legitimate, elected governments. It had several major successes in Angola and Sierra Leone. Since then, so many people have tried to attach their names to EO or claim to be the successor to EO. You state in your book that you want to tell the story of what transpired on the ground during these operations. Is there anything in particular that you feel needs to be rectified?

VH: I will never try to discredit other PMCs or security companies for mimicking EO. EO was the ice-breaker for PMCs and will remain like that. The managers of EO were professional in their approach, and a sound organization was established. It became a very effective business that showed results on time. Maybe these were the reasons others went after EO. There will never be a replacement.

My book showcases what was going on during my time as commander on the ground. It is not a romantic book, but rather a guide, and I was trying to give the reader some insight systematically on our approach. It will be not that interesting for, or rather it may prove complicated for, someone who lacks a security or military background.

SOFREP: I would take exception to that last statement, Colonel! It is immensely interesting. It is not difficult to understand and I believe anyone who has an interest in private military companies or African conflicts will find it absorbing and articulately stated. Thank you for your time, and best of luck for success with your book and your work to bring peace and stability to the continent of Africa.

South African Special Forces (Recce) Selection

Oringally published by SOFREP.com


Note: This article is a special one to me. An individual found his fathers ‘diary’ of training during selection and sent it to me during my string of ongoing articles on the wars of Rhodesia and South Africa. There was one problem. It was hand written in Afrikaans: (Afrikaans is a language of southern Africa, derived from the form of Dutch brought to the Cape by Protestant settlers in the 17th century, and an official language of South Africa.)

A legendary soldier Willem Ratte, a native of South West Africa, now Namibia, served in the Rhodesian SAS from 1974 until 1979, then went back to South Africa and commanded the Recce Squadron of the famed 32 Battalion until 1989. He graciously translated this diary for me in record time and deserves a whole study/biography of his own. ( The typical soldier in Rhodesia served 6-10 weeks in the Bush with 2 weeks at home. In South Africa, generally speaking, they were on constant combat duty. This amount of combat amazed me when first researching Southern African conflicts.

Some individuals served more than 15 years on this schedule and then went into the Private Military Sector and continued their combat duties. I asked one soldier about this rotation and the amount of combat endured compared to the shorter amount of combat today’s military will experience. He said, ‘Dan, we were defending our homes and our way of lives. There was no choice and it did not matter. It put a new respect and perspective of the way of life for the combat soldier of the Cold War in Sub-Saharan Africa.



The Western Media has disregarded the fact that Communist forces backed with supplies and personnel from Russia, Cuba, East Germany and China seeking to invade the borders and overthrow the Government. I often say that both in Rhodesia and South Africa were as much political as physical. No matter the internal issues and problems nations faced once the left the Commonwealth of England and their created institution’s legacies, there was a physical war of invasion. Just as America would drop it’s internal struggles to counteract a foreign nation that militarily invaded our Southern Border, Rhodesia and South Africa did the same thing. Communists were and are master propogandists who exploit side issues to obfuscate their main goals.

The South African Reconnaissance Regiments are one of the lesser-known and understood groups of Special Operations Forces in the world today. Especially the unit during its inception and first 20-25 years due to the political issues surrounding the country.

They have been through many phases and missions under the command of very different governments, especially in the last quarter-century. Today’s ‘Recce’ is often attached to missions of the United Nations for peacekeeping missions in various parts of Africa. The old SADF (South African Defense Force) was primarily a highly specialized unit born in the midst of a growing fire of communist insurgencies across the continent.

Similar to the big Army mindset of the United States that was against any type of Special Forces, South Africa did not see the need for anything beyond the vaunted airborne forces known as the Parabats. A few visionary soldiers saw the need for highly specialized and mobile forces, able to perform deep recon and direct action behind enemy lines. In 1967, Jan Breytenbrach, a highly innovative officer in the Parachute Battalions secured permission to take 12 of his men to Rhodesia and undergo SAS Selection in an attempt to bring that training back and multiply it and eventually form up a successful Counterinsurgency (COIN) unit of its own.

Many growing armies in war and peace seek knowledge from other countries who have experience in the areas they want to strategically employ. Breytenbach and all of his men were ground down with intention but passed Rhodesian SAS selection in good shape. This nucleus would be the beginning of a unit that would be permanent and legendary.

The initial training of a special operations soldier is generally referred to as Selection. There are other terms used around the world but Selection is a word that holds significance. The magnitude of what men go through to make it into a unit is intended as a mutual selection. The instructors get a chance to determine the suitability of a candidate through whatever means they can devise but equally important is the soldier’s chance to select whether he truly wants to follow through and be standing at the end.

Each unit has its own tried and true methods to strip everything away down to raw and bloody will and each soldier must find a way, inside, to not only stay in the game but to find a way to perform up to standards.

The Recces went through their own learning curve to find the best men. In the beginning, a traditional SAS-style course was undertaken. Half of the cruel and unusual punishment came from the landscape and wildlife of Africa itself. The heat, terrain, and ability to endure it would ensure Darwins ‘Survival of the Fittest’ had some say so in the Recces.

Once the unit became official in the mid-1970s the recruiting and training classes commenced, the cadre often found themselves searching far and wide for candidates. With the rigorous process of applying, showing physical fitness, and a suitability interview with a psychiatrist much was invested in prospects before they showed up for Selection.

A series of events in 1975 proved that the ‘head shrinks’ would be an invaluable tool and that the evolution onto a plane of pain and endurance was that required the greatest war fighting tool of all, mental acuity and the ability to compartmentalize fatigue and pain into a small shoe box. As with today’s Selection courses, many candidates have to be forced off the course due to medical orders from the head Surgeon. Many good men are rolled back or permanently disqualified due to accidental injury or simple and recurrent issues such as stress fractures of the feet that will not heal.

One class began with 14 candidates. Only one of them graduated. He was on the course alone for a great part of it. General Fritz Loots, who had become the General for Special Forces command and development with Breytenbach was quite distressed. Missions for the Recces were available and a lack of manpower was holding the entire concept hostage.

The course officer had also reported that a further eight of them had the potential to become operators. Both Loots and Breytenbach decided that until further notice, no one would leave the course without permission. They reasoned that duty with the Recces was chosen and like any other unit, it was their duty to stay on regardless.

Another class of 28 formed up and within a week fourteen men had thrown in the towel. Angered by this, the 14 were ordered back to Selection and several of them continued on to graduation and proved to be useful and capable Recces.

Two psychiatrists were put on duty to be available to help the men on Selection. The idea of seeing a ‘headshrinker’ being for the weak-minded was slowly dispelled and accepted by the majority of the cadre.

Although eventually men would be allowed to drop or ‘throw in the towel,’ the importance of a strong psychological workup before and during Selection greatly improved their success rate. They also improved the entire pre-selection work up to determine the likely success of volunteers. Sports science was coming into its own and was advantaged by doctors to find out if the cardiovascular system was capable of enduring training. Joint flexibility, wear and tear on knees, hips and lower back was profiled with X-rays and load tests to weed out those who were unable to carry up to 120 pounds on their back.

The old school method of finding bodies and letting them sink or swim was not proving useful and amounted to a waste of time and money to a fledgling organization. In essence, men who showed up had nothing standing between them and success except the unforeseen injury.

The cadre learned as well. Simple mistreatment and discouraging an individual did not gain positive results. Pushing a man to his limits and instilling desire while holding to the rigorous standards gave the best results.

However, these changes did not lessen the difficult nature of the course. Recce Selection proved to be one of the most difficult in the world. As with any mission, the terrain dictates the type of training needed. Operating in the subtropic heat and arid environment proved to be the downfall of many men.

Some people simply could not acclimatize to the heavy workload in the heat. Endless marching through rough terrain with packs, rationed food, and water day after day was simply too much for many men.

Being able to map read and keep yourself and your team on a ruler’s edge to an objective was fundamental. Doing so after a 24-hour march shouldering an 80-pound ruck with blood pouring out of your boots from raw skin and limited food and water became exceedingly difficult.

A man’s temperament was constantly under surveillance, especially at these key times. A cool head in the midst of extreme physical discomfort was paramount. A man who would lose his head with another candidate or God forbid an instructor could lead to a swift ticket home. The Recces needed the type of mentality that could ruck 150 klicks, recon a target, and hoof it back on foot with the enemy in pursuit, being out of food and searching for water.

The wildlife of Africa was a built-in part of the course that could not be avoided and would always be present in combat operations. A notorious exercise to quell the natural fear of predators including the crocodile is presented in Harry McCallion’s book “Killing Zone.” McCallion had served in the British Paras and sought adventure in South Africa. Upon arrival, he was offered a slot to try out for the Recces. He was accustomed to the extreme physical fitness required and endless marching but one exercise nearly caused him to leave straight away.

The class was conducting evolutions near a lake. The men were brought up to see the crocodiles that slithered up and down its banks and into the water. Later into the night after endless log and rifle PT and hard running they ended back up at the lake. They were instructed to dress down to their skivvies and swim across a croc-infested lake. There was a lot of protesting, and especially from McCallion.

Why in the world would he risk his life during Selection? A rope was there to help you get across. Twenty men refused to swim the 100 yards and disqualified themselves. McCallion decided that he had some and pass the course, alive or dead, and went for it. He lived as did the others.

Later a course instructor came to him and told him the reason for the evolution. A similar situation had occurred recently on a hot extraction after contact. Several chanced it and made it but two men refused. A scout happened to have found a narrow place farther upriver. The whole team’s life was in jeopardy due to fear. They didn’t want mindless men. They wanted men who could face their fear in the direst of circumstances, overcome them and continue the mission.

Almost all selection courses have their version of Hell Week. After my personal interviews with two Recces one thing stood out that the South Africans required of the men during the most mentally and physically grueling part of the Selection course to determine if they had the fortitude to become Recces. The intentional lack of food for 5-6 days. Whereas in BUD/S they are fed up to 6000 calories/day, potential Recces had a handful of rice here, a fruit there. In fact, one of the Recces I interviewed said that was the hardest part and probably the thing that messed with their will to finish the most.

When the body is beyond empty and at a physical low, the South Africans believed they could find a man’s deepest desire. Taking one of the most powerful needs that humans have and depriving them of it while continuing the demands of endless marches and PT could reveal the men who could stick around and endure the missions required by these Soldiers.

All of the bushcraft, tracking, counter tracking, minor tactics, assaulting tactics, reconnaissance fieldcraft could only be given to the men who were physically, mentally, and morally able to undergo the fear, deprivation, and punishment that is Selection for the Reconnaissance Commandos.

Below you will find a Recce candidate’s notes during the equivalent of Hell Week. It contains many gems and insights. The translation belongs to Willem Ratte, one of the most experienced small unit reconnaissance operators in the world.


  • Wednesday (4.5.75): We got wet in the rain that night and it was bloody cold.
  • Thursday (6.5.75): Start 6 am with PT running through water and over sand dunes With a full sandbag. Lectures. Went to Sibaya lake where we had to swim. Nearly saw my ass. At 6pm we started our z (bedford) BD with ropes too sore. Waiting now for the next trick.
  • Friday (7.5.75): The next trick was to walk to Sibaya lake with full sandbag 16km. This morning we had to double 16 km back to camp. Then we had to run with kit on the beach and the crawl through the surf. Midday we had a compass lecture, practical. We walk up to our hips in a huge swamp. Then shooting practice. 8pm we start to walk, until 2am, approx 20km.
  • Saturday (8.5.75): the night was heavy & cold. 6am we started to pull the bedford with ropes, until 9am, approx 4km. Suffer heavy because we have been without food for 2 days now. 10am we start walking until 1.30pm, approx 8km. Midday we do observation skills. Tests that evening. 8pm we must do 16km again. GREAT EVENING FOR ME.
  • Sunday (9.5.75. 6): Am we double back to camp. Rifle inspection and bush lane. Swim with kit and ambush for night.
  • Monday (10.5.75): after ambush we have to move along beach to our RV. Arrive in the morning at 7am, approx 10km then mountain climbing exercises. We are heavy & hungry. 3 days without food. Get food and sleep well.
  • Tuesday (11.5.75): rest and get kit ready for big thing. Jump tonight for our starting point. We will have to do 400+km.
  • Wednesday (12.5.75): Jump last night and start walking until 2am, approx 20km. start walking at 6am. Do 28km until 12pm. Ha!
  • Thursday (13.5.75): Walk approx 25 km to Sibaya lake. Then row for 20km to the other side of the lake to the next RV.
  • Friday (14.5.75): Walk with the boat for approx 8km. Suffer a lot. Then walk for 30km to coast. Eat lekker (nice) pap (porridge).
  • Saturday (15.5.75): Start walking 5am. Must do 36km before 3pm. get there 4.30. Only group there. Throw food out for us by parachute.
  • Sunday (16.5.75): Wait until 1pm for others. Made nice porridge for breakfast. Must now walk 43km. They take all our kit and food.
  • Monday (17.5.75): It is now 6am and we are hungry and ice-cold. Wait for instructors. We walk approx 40km in direction of Ovbombo mountains. Must go over river. Me and Hein go over first. Half-way the rope breaks. float back to bank. Hein probably kicks off rope which holds rifles, 2 metres from shore. Search but find nothing.
  • Tuesday (18.5.75): Walk until this morning 4.15. We receive orders to walk back 45km with a pole. My feet are one blister.
  • Wednesday (19.5.75): Walk approx 30km until 9,30. my feet heavy & sore. Cross river by boat. Eat coffee and bread. very tired and full of longing.
  • Thursday (20.5.75): get to RV at 9.30am. We cammo ourselves with ash. Think is nearly over. General loots is at RV and we must do buddy rating. We lay an ambush 24km further on.
  • Friday (21.5.75): Get to RV at 8am. Bush was very thick. The next RV 15+12km far. My feet heavy & sore. Take short-cut through swamp. (They) Catch us and take our shoelaces and all our food.
  • Saturday (22.5.75): had to walk 12km further the previous night to emergency RV. From there we start walking at 1am. For 45km. Have no food. with (native) chief we eat porridge, tea and coffee. Full of longing. We are first to get to RV. Tell us to walk along road for 10km. Hope this is the last stretch. (They) chase us all the way. Get there 5pm. 6pm they tell us back 25km. We are heavy & tired, exhausted and hungry. Walk only until 8.30. O ja, ;we ate many dates. Wish I could give them to Hannelie.
  • Sunday (23.5.75) Start walking at 4am. am still stiff. 40km. Get to RV at 10am. First there. Get food and tell us to walk along road, individual test, appr 5km, when instructor in the bush calls us and gives us a beer and tells us the course is over. Bloody glad. Gen Loots also there.

Rhodesia’s D Squadron (Pt. 2): South African Special Forces Raid into Mozambique

Originally published by SOFREP.com



D Squadron’s tactical HQ was initially set up at Buffalo Range, a very busy base of operations for the Rhodesian Light Infantry and the SAS. Set in the southeastern part of Rhodesia, the terrain varied greatly from the borderlands to the north. There were no lush mountains and thick foliage. It was dry and sparse. The AO was called the “Russian Front” by the Rhodesians. One might assume that it was dubbed such due to the presence of the Russian advisors helping the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). But in fact, it was the dry humor of the Troopies hearkening back to World War Two’s most dreaded and deadly front for the Germans. The Eastern or Russian Front had a lonely, deadly reputation. Punishment or falling from favor with one’s higher chain of command elicited a posting to the literal Russian Front.

It was here, in Mozambique, that the Recces would be assured of contact with the enemy and would progress as a unit against communist-trained terrorists, very similar to the ones they were to face in the future along their northern borders, most notably in Angola and Mozambique during the Border War.

Within a short amount of time, the SAS intelligence liaison officer brought them indoors for the brief and revealed a map of their assigned area. It seemed rather large to them. How would it be possible to effectively control such a piece of real estate? The border alone, north to south, was 150 kilometers long. It seemed a folly to expect 55 men to cover, let alone control, this wide area. At that point, I am certain that many men wondered if a voluntary departure could be had. There were a small number of men who would later request posting back to South Africa, and it would be granted.

The men of the reconnaissance regiments were professional soldiers. They knew that to better learn their profession, they would have to take any and all situations and find a way to dominate. Besides, if their SAS brethren were doing it, surely they could do it as well.

The Rhodesian intel officer informed them that they would be chaperoned on their first mission to get a lay of the land and useful procedures that the SAS had developed during their operations. However, after that, the Recces would be running their own show. Their insertion methods would cover all of the training that they had received. Static-line drops, helo inserts, and even HALO jumps for sensitive missions that required absolute stealth when dropping near known strong points.

Although these operations were vital to the development of the Recces’ history and capabilities, it was classified top secret until 1983, years after the Bush War ended. On the surface, South Africa wanted to maintain some neutrality and distance from the much-maligned Rhodesian government.

Records for these missions come mainly from the writings of Peter Stiff in the book “The Silent War.” He details this period through interviews with the men and a tiny handful of memoirs by those who participated.

Once again, South Africa found itself battling the birth pangs of a full-fledged war, fighting against communist-trained armies from Angola to Mozambique. At this point, Rhodesia was persona non grata to the world community, and South Africa was quickly reaching that point. Secrecy, as much as possible, was desired.

Dry runs began in order to gain familiarity with the terrain and enemy. It was a short affair. After this was done, the first team inserted via static line and made their way to the objective designated for the first mission. The main terrain feature was a rail line. It was vital for the communists to keep it open for supplies. At one time, it had run from the coast all the way into Rhodesia, but the fall of the Portuguese colonial government ended that. Like most societies, villages and towns tend to grow up around trade routes, railroads, and vehicular traffic. As is the case with most small unit teams conducting direct-action missions behind enemy lines, reconnaissance and sabotage were the objective.

The first team made it to the vicinity of the rail line fairly quickly. Knowing that the area was a hot spot, they formed out an extended line in case of contact. A service road ran adjacent to the tracks. Being well trained and professional, they crossed the road, trying to leave no trace indicating their true direction. Upon reaching the actual track, they pulled security and rushed across undetected. As fate and the unpredictability of combat dictated, they didn’t have to wait long until contact was made. Lt. Corrie Meerholz recounts their first contact in Stiff’s book.

From concealed positions, they spotted a man walking toward them on the rail line. He appeared to be alone. They thought that strange for such an active AO. However, not seeing anyone else after careful observation, Meerholz made the decision to effect a prisoner snatch. As the man came closer, they saw he carried a RPD machine gun. Suddenly, a man appeared behind him with an RPG. The initial assumption that this was a civilian was gone.

More men appeared over the horizon. The LT decided to go ahead with a prisoner snatch and to engage the enemy. He ordered two men to abandon their weapons in order to be free to subdue the “would be” prisoner while his team provided covering fire.

The seconds ticked away and the men crawled forward. A tactical problem emerged. For effective fire on the trailing soldiers, his own would have to stand and reveal their positions, potentially diminishing the advantage they would have through concealment. The clock wound down and a decision was made, but not by the LT. One of the two men assigned to the snatch had carried his weapon against orders. The soldier saw the predicament and decided against showing himself to an enemy patrol unarmed. This soldier broke cover and shot the intended target and the RPG-7 gunner behind him. A brief firefight broke out but the enemy fled.

Their cover blown, they called for an extract. Not wasting any opportunities to take down their enemy, the bodies, weapons, and equipment were booby trapped.

On their ride back to Rhodesia, they were informed that a radio intercept confirmed the sabotage had worked and killed several Terrs. Although a short mission, they achieved the first kills of many that were to come. Recces were to become a fixture of ‘D’ Squadron until the latter end of 1979.

Although this seems to be a small action, many more were to follow which is beyond the scope of this article. The rotation of handfuls of men during the 70’s gave the Recces a template on how to used highly trained soldiers. Since the Army early on was trying to understand how to employ them, several deadly decisions were made. Many in high command determined that these were a bunch of overtrained ‘tough men’ to be used as shock troops. Several of these incidents resulted in the investments of Selection and Training- and ultimately human life- that Recces from Battalion level to the major strategic Reconnaissance and Raids began to be used in a strategic fashion. Many argue about which unit was full of ‘Hard Men’, the truth is anyone who went through the ‘pipeline’ ending up on the battlefield, just as today’s American Dev Gru and Delta, they were a cut above in their mentality and physical ability.

Rhodesia’s SAS ‘D’ Squadron: The South African Connection…Part 1

Originally published by SOFREP.com


(Note: It has proved difficult to find ‘block’ information on ‘D’ Squadron outside of Peter Schiff’s book The Silent War. Since writing this article in 2015 I have been able to speak to members of the South African Recces and learned more. After this initial deployment described below, Recces were sent in pairs or small numbers – not only to help bolster the critical mission of the SAS but to gain operational experience for the developing South African Special Operations Forces.)


In 1977 and 1978, Rhodesia’s war against the communist terrorists was heating up to proportions not experienced before. It was all hands on decks. Contacts and casualties mounted as the CTs grew exponentially and began utilizing the border of Mozambique, at that point abandoned by the Portuguese colonials.

In particular, the Gaza province was made up of flat, featureless terrain with the only significant landmark being the railroad system. Free trade had been the order of the day across the Rhodesia/Mozambique border. Once the colonial government fell, all bets were off. Due to the sanctions imposed by the UN and virtually the rest of the world, the Rhodesians vigorously pursued their major rail line south from Salisbury to the Beit Bridge and the South African border.

South Africa had its own agenda, but saw the inherent value in helping its northern neighbor fend off the tide of communist African nationalism. Political battles raged between the pols and the generals over what should be done and to what extent. The British South African police were tied heavily to Rhodesia, historically. This relationship would spread to other units in southwest Africa and Angola.

The military of South Africa not only felt somewhat duty bound to help an ally, but sought to gain operational experience in war, as their own future was uncertain. At one point, half of Rhodesia’s air force consisted of South African pilots and crew. But South Africa maintained a ‘giveth and taketh away’ philosophy. They were concerned that their own internal strife brought on by apartheid and the external forces of communism would require the world’s support in order for the country to survive intact. Also for this reason, the following information was considered classified until 1983—three years after the fall of Rhodesia.

The South African Reconnaissance Regiments or ‘Recces’ had been evolving into a force in their own right, but like the early days of the Green Berets, the army did not know what to do with them. Their commander saw an opportunity to show the army what they were capable of during a suitable war in the north. In the early to mid ’70s, several men spent time attached to the Selous Scouts and the SAS, gaining knowledge and also teaching skills they had acquired in Com-Ops. The exchange was never more than a handful of people at a time, but a relationship developed.

The need for manpower on Rhodesia’s end and the need for experience for the Recces set the wheels in motion for the deployment of a SAS squadron that technically never existed.

In his masterpiece “The Silent War,” an encyclopedia of the Recce’s history, Peter Stiff relates that, in December of 1977, 55 men in ‘A’ Group 1st Reconnaissance Regiment were pulled into Durban for intense training in preparation for what was believed to be a direct-action mission. Once this training was complete, the men boarded the ever-reliable Dakota C-47s. They had thought they would be flying to their target in C-130s.

Once aboard, a surprise awaited them. Boxes were ripped open and the men were told to change out of their uniforms and into the fatigues bearing the familiar pattern of the Rhodesian SAS. After landing at a base in Operational Area Buffalo Range, a briefing was given telling them that they would be operating as D squadron of the SAS and that Afrikaans was a forbidden language in order to enhance their cover. For some of them, this would prove difficult.

They linked up with a Rhodesian officer who briefed them in detail, indicating that they would be responsible for controlling a vast area: the border with Mozambique, over 150 kilometers long. The men were doubtful. It was a large swathe patrolled by two distinct armies. The SAS officer assured them that they would be chaperoned on their initial mission, which he then casually mentioned was a static-line drop that same evening!

Rotations would be three months in length, spent continuously in the bush. Over the course of Rhodesia’s Bush War, some Recce operators would deploy as many as four times. The Recces were a tough, well-trained group of bush fighters, but they were still in the infancy of their own war. The commanding officers of the reconnaissance regiments saw the writing on the wall with insurgent tactics being a main component of South Africa’s enemies’ strategy in the border war.

The deployments in Rhodesia helped solidify the unit. Corrie Meerholz, a core member of the Recces said, “We would not be where we are today so far as equipment, tactics, and experience is concerned [without that deployment]. It made a great contribution in structuring our minor tactics course.”

It would not be more than a day into their first deployment before they faced the grinder of ‘The Russian Front’, beginning a steep learning curve that would influence them for several decades.

An American Odyssey in Rhodesia (Part Three)

Originally published by SOFREP.com


He finished his medic course in July of 1974 and got his wish to be posted back to the RLI. He was posted in an operational area around Mt. Darwin, dealing with injuries sustained by the troops in the field. He found it to be a comfortable place where he could write and get stamps, but the boredom began to get to him. He wanted to be on the sharp end of the spear. He proposed to the CO that he wanted to go out and act as a medic and infantryman. He had both skills and the CO approved his request.

He joined the sticks going on callouts. It was here that he had a chance to treat onsite battle casualties. On one operation, he spent the night in a krall attending to some civilian casualties awaiting a casevac the next morning. A bit of a harrowing experience.

Terrorist activity increased during this time around Mt. Darwin and his skills as a medic and soldier were put to use. He noted that having a combat medic in the line increased the confidence and morale of the Troopies. Coey began to regain his sense of purpose and vigor that had brought him to Rhodesia. He writes, “It’s important for me to remain a combat soldier and a specialist medic, because only then will some people listen to you when you attempt to explain the bigger issues; of such, the battle for Rhodesia is only one.” And, “I feel that I have found my historical role here, and once that is finished, I don’t know what I’ll do….”

There was trepidation at granting his request due to the lack of trained medics at the time. He believed that in doing this it would improve the morale and respect of the Medical Corps. A Commando Medic. He cited the use of the USMC and their use of the Corpsman in the ranks of the rifle company. A medic who acted in a combatant role would serve a dual purpose of being able to fight, as well as a better chance of saving valuable troops by responding on the spot.

After some R&R he went back but was again posted to HQ. He again asked for a different posting, hopefully permanent in terms of his duties. Many people implored him to look at his duties as a medic and non-combatant as a blessing, but he would hear none of it. “I have an inner peace because I trust God to look after my safety, even if I get drilled one day. I’ll have the satisfaction of knowing that I achieved my purpose in this country, and that I gave all I could. It is important to do this even though others may betray you.”

Permission was granted for this experiment and he returned to Mt. Darwin as an unattached medic. He would go on whatever fire-force operation was called up. In December of that year, the tempo increased and he was on almost continuous duty. The RLI was racking up kills with few casualties of its own. Coey had a close call when one of the choppers he was on was came under fire with the pilot being shot. Fortunately, the co-pilot put the bird down without further injury.

Coey spent Christmas in Salisbury, which he admitted was very ‘lonely,’ but he remained motivated. He recounts that his performance in Fire Force was enough to have most medics retrained with the capability to act as medic and infantryman. In influencing the Army, he felt that he was expunging the humiliation that had come with his dismissal from the SAS.

During the following months, he rotated in and out of Mt. Darwin and the Zambezi Valley. With renewed pride and resoluteness, he decided to apply for citizenship as a Rhodesian. In June, he was granted citizenship and also applied for a new passport as a dual citizen. “What a chuckle, filling out those papers under a portrait of Henry Kissinger !” He was now firmly committed to finishing his military service, and looked forward to possibly staying on in Rhodesia permanently.

Rotations continued, forever chasing down the Terrs, sometimes coming up dry and others resulting in heavy clashes. By this time he has participated in close to 60 Fire Force missions and had established himself in the RLI as a solid trooper and capable medic. The tone of Coey’s letters home and journal entries became less longing and more stable as he had finally found his place, contributing to the destruction of terrorists and rendering aid to his wounded soldiers. It seemed that Coey was finally content that he was carrying out the ‘historical mission’ for his life that he had spent the last 3 years trying to find.

The Last Battle

On July 19th 1975, Two Commando was posted at Mt. Darwin for Fire Force duties. 7-Troop was designated the ‘first wave.’ They would be first responders to any call outs for support to patrols who had made contact in the bush. As the Commando Medic, Coey was assigned to Lt. Du Plooy’s stick, which acted as command and control.

A TA unit had been ambushed that morning by approximately six Terrs. The TA’s returned fire, killing two, but the rest broke contact and ran. These soldiers began to track and regain contact but had no success. 7-Troop was not called out as a result but a request for trackers was fulfilled. Coey went with them to be on scene if they regained contact.

Trackers began to pick up spoor and then 7-Troop was called in for backup, as it wasn’t known if the Terrs were returning to a larger group. The tracks led them in to a dense, overgrown river bed known as a denga. With several curves in the river, it was a perfect defensive position to lay up an ambush as soldiers rounded a bend.

Moving in on the Terrs, three members of 7-Troop were shot, two fatally, one had his legs shredded. They hunkered down and awaited reinforcements due to the fact that they could neither spot the Terrs nor assess their strength. Lt. Du Pooly arrived on the scene with Coey shortly after. With the possibility of saving the life of the third wounded man, John Alan Coey slid down into the river bed and approached his fallen comrades. Unknown to either Coey or the Lieutenant, Terrs were directly underneath the insertion point. Coey was shot twice, once through the head and a second one through the ankle. The Lieutenant was also wounded.

Over the next few hours, the attempts of the RLI to dislodge the Terrs were unsuccessful as the roots and foliage were thick enough to stop grenades from penetrating their hiding spot, and nearly impossible to get a view of the location. The SAS was called in as darkness came to use their night sights. Around midnight, the Terrs broke contact and ran. It was only then that the bodies of the RLI soldiers were retrieved from the river bed. It has been a bad day for the RLI.

Aftermath, Significance and Remembrance

Fingers were pointed and soldiers lost. David Armstrong says of this contact, “The riverbed contact was the worst single event of my three years with 2 Commando and the only one in which the terrorists got the better of us…”

John Alan Coey, a citizen of both America and Rhodesia, was laid to rest with full military honors. Coey had come to Rhodesia to fight the evils of Communism, to preserve the dying off of western civilization, and fulfill what he repeatedly called his ‘historical mission in life.’ In many ways, he fought other battles along the way but remained true to his convictions, whatever the price.

Many can point out the futility of his death. They can say that it was a worthless cause and that the sacrifice was in vain. I think not. Those few guardians of the good in this world can look to his life and death and know they are in good company.

They went with songs to the battle, they were young.

Straight of limb, true of eyes, steady and aglow.

They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted,

They fell with their faces to the foe.

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:

Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.

At the going down of the sun and in the morning,

We will remember them.


Note: This article was based solely on the Journals of JA Coey. I was able to contact his brother and he was thankful and verified that is is accurate in fact and sentiment.

An American Odyssey in Rhodesia (Part Two)

Originally published by SOFREP.com


In September of 1972, he found himself at a crossroads and began to express his disappointment on issues agreed upon by British Delegates and Ian Smith.

He was bother by unimpeded progress of Black Majority rule, stationing of foreign troops, an increase of parliamentary seats by nationalists, and coupling the Rhodesian dollar to the Pound.

He felt that these things were the exact opposite of the cause of independence and preservation of Western Civilization, and that African nationalism was simply a route for Communism to take over. His commitment to his enlistment vacillated, but he pressed on in hopes of fighting off the Red Hoard.

When he was posted to his unit he found it hard to bond with the troopers. Active front line troops require a certain mindset. Those living the lifestyle of possibly dying, often live their lives on the edge during their free time to escape the stress. The old adage of ‘you don’t send choir boys to fight a war’ rang especially true. Coey was a teetotaler and his mates might have taken his disinterest in the things young soldiers love as an affront.

He did manage to perform well enough to go for Officer’s Selection, which he was most excited about. His internal angst about Rhodesia adhering to a perfect ideology and an Army that enforced it caused some reluctance that was noted by the officers board. He was told, “You take life too seriously and you must project your personality and withdraw from your shell.”

He continued on but was dismissed from the course for academic and temperament issues. He began to realize that some of his views were considered subversive to the morale of the Rhodesian Army. His articles had reached the ears of people in charge and it was deemed best not to have an officer making any contrary statements to official stances within its ranks. He was rotated back to the SAS and began aggressive patrols searching out Terr camps. He determined that he would not be deterred and not falter on his personal beliefs. He enjoyed this but was still not meshing with the men of the SAS.

Things came to a head in December of 1973, when his Major said he would no longer be going on patrols and his jump pay would be revoked. He stated that Coey ‘just wasn’t worth it.’ It was a great humiliation that caused him to consider applying for a discharge, but instead he chose to go to the RLI.

Coey reassesed his purpose and goals and wrote this.

My purpose in coming to Rhodesia has been to fulfill my Christian duty of opposing Communism in two ways. First is to focus attention on the Conspiracy by refusing to be its pawn and by writing to expose it. The second is to actively fight Commuist-inpsired terrorism in Africa by Military service.

Even though he had become a victim of his own ideology in the SAS and Officers course, he was about to embark on what he felt to be his real mission and put actions behind his convictions.

Coey managed to stay on with the SAS in spite of his orders to stand down, and even went on another External to Mozambique, which caused the Major to initiate an opportunity to get rid of Coey. He demanded that he choose a different regiment or corps within the week. During this time, he reached his lowest point while in Africa.

He continued writing and published another article for Mr. Brown. He decided to take this proverbial ‘slap in the face’ as an opportunity to learn something new. It also prompted him to apply for a discharge from the Army entirely. It never went through. He had signed on for Five years and the Army was in no mood to let decent people leave. He would have to desert to get out of his contract. In the end, he remained resolute to stay with the cause that had brought him to Africa.

After a lengthy interview, he was given the option of attending the Medics Course in Bulawayo, which was six months long and would allow him to advance in rank to a full Corporal. In his journal, he wrote that he would be reposted to a combat outfit, hopefully the RLI in Salisbury.

Even though he enjoyed the education he was receiving, he wrote, “My inability to completely submit to organization has caused me much grief and embarrassment because, sometimes, I think too much of myself, instead of having confidence in those in authority over me. I have made mistakes, and they been my own fault. I cannot blame it on bad luck or circumstances. I hope I can redeem myself before leaving the Army, somehow…..”

Before Returning to the SAS I wanted to share this Unique story about John Alan Coey- An American ODYSSEY in Rhodesia…

Originally published by SOFREP.com


John Alan Coey was an American who fought and died in Rhodesia. This article is a commentary and analysis of a complicated and unique person based on his memoirs. It was received well and regarded as accurate by those who knew him, including his brother.

I consider Rhodesia a bit of American Military History due to the fact that an estimated 300 Americans, mostly Vietnam vets, went there. Some were dirtbags, fleeing their life in America, or trying to live the image of a Soldier of Fortune, while others proved professional and valorous in their war against communism.

The 1960s and ’70s was a tumultuous era. It was a time when people questioned and rebelled against the government of the United States, in large part due to the Vietnam conflict. Many of America’s best and brightest were sent off to a place that most couldn’t point out on a map and could not conceive what national security threat it posed to the United States. Vietnam was a multifaceted problem that started off directly after World War Two and incrementally evolved into American involvement through Advisors, then to a full-fledged conventional military commitment. The faithful continued to support our government and tried to do their duty to stop the advance of communism. However, a doctrine of containment left the military and political establishment in a quagmire. There was no clear objective that could be attained.

The seeds of discord began to grow among the people, especially in our universities. From student protests, the burning of flags and draft cards, to armed retaliation against student protesters at Kent State, things began to ignite into a social inferno. The Cold War was far from cold and was being contested in places seemingly irrelevant to national security in the minds of the average person. However, there were many who believed that communism was indeed a worthy foe to be engaged and put down.

Most Cold Warriors believed that allowing communism to spread would eventually lead to the decline and disintegration of Western and Christian civilization. And those men believed that our own government was weak in its resolve and cared more for détente than aggressive protection and destruction of the opposition.


As the Vietnam war began to close shop, those professional soldiers who were true believers found an outlet in many areas of the world to employ their trade and live according to their conscience. Here we find one of the first Americans to see Rhodesia as a place in which there a true battle between communism and Western civilization was taking place.

John Alan Coey was from Columbus, Ohio. Unlike many of the soldiers to follow the road to Rhodesia, Coey had not served in Vietnam. A devout Christian, who made no bones about mixing his politics and religion, he was preparing to enter the Marine Corps. He was in the ROTC program and had spent the summer of his junior year at Quantico to set his career in motion. Yet, in 1971-72 he began to rethink his commitment to serve in the armed forces of the United States.

He saw the “Vietnamization” of the war as a betrayal of the cause to which the U.S. was committed to. His opinion was that the fighting men of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts were betrayed by politicians who lacked the will to engage and crush communism. He cited the dismissal of Douglas MacArthur and other famous military leaders as examples of a weak will to win and preserve Freedom, Democracy, and Western Civilization.

In his journal, which he kept from the day he left the United States to his death, he details his ideology and the actions in which he participated in Rhodesia. He decided to ask for dismissal from his commitment to the Marine Corps in what he calls a “Soldier’s Protest.” It outlined his reasons as follows

  • The deliberate prevention by the U.S. government of victory over communist forces in Southeast Asia.
  • The attempted overthrow of the constitutional republic of the United States by a revolutionary conspiracy of internationalists, collectivists, and communists within and without of the U.S. government
  • The attempted destruction by government Defense officials of the fighting capabilities of the American military.

He was granted his request and after graduation in 1972 from Ohio State, he set off for war elsewhere. These opinions are no doubt as controversial then as they would be now. It was his firmness of belief that prompted him to leave the U.S. and find a place where his efforts would be spent in what he believed to be a true and unfettered battle against communism.

These ideologies along with his deep Christian faith would allow him to persevere, but they would also hinder him and cause confusion and misunderstanding during his service in Rhodesia. He would find the enemy he was looking for and fight battles both in the bush as well as within his soul. The anvil of war would test his resolve and beliefs to the uttermost.

Coey arrived in South Africa and made his way to Salisbury. He immediately swore into the Rhodesian Army because of the application he had submitted before traveling. He was put into the Rhodesian Light Infantry 19-week basic training that would introduce him to the Rhodesian Army and begin his journey. He was struck by the differences of the training and mostly the discipline that was a marked contrast to his time with the Marine Corps. He took to it well and understood it to be integral to the type of warfare they were engaged in.

During this time he met many foreigners. In particular, he met with another Marine who had deserted and fled to Rhodesia. He was none too impressed with this man and felt he had enlisted for the wrong reasons. He struck up a friendship with a combat veteran of the Vietnam war with whom he felt more synergy.

The weeks passed and he performed well enough to be considered for SAS selection. He was excited at this prospect as he felt it would help him get to the sharp end of the spear and engage the enemy. He went directly to the Unit. Five of the 15 made it through his SAS Selection course. He then proceeded for the next six months on to specialist training. He was the third American to join the ranks. Of the other two and only one remained, the other having deserted back to the States.

At this time he had contact with a Mr. Brown, a journalist in South Africa. He submitted articles to him and was pleased that they were to be published. His first article would be his “Protest” — a manifesto of sorts. In many of his published articles, he explained his worldview and according to it the reasons Rhodesia was fighting the war. He described those whom he felt were the true enemies of freedom and democracy, and he even outlined some domestic problems he felt the Rhodesian government was not handling properly. Although this gave him some notoriety, it didn’t bode well overall for his standing in the army.


PART 2 Next-

The Rhodesian SAS: Selection & Operator Training

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Rhodesia’s ‘C’ Squadron- The Beginning

The U.K.’s Special Air Service needs no introduction to anyone remotely interested in military history or Special Operations. However, there is much more to learn about this elite unit when one traces its existence and influence across the once global British Empire. Much of the power of the Brits was derived from their colonies and their stock of available military recruits. Australia and New Zealand have retained the SAS as the designation of their Special Operations Forces.

After the end of the Second World War, the British government saw no further use for the unit and disbanded it in October 1945. Within a year of that decision, a reversal was made and the SAS was resurrected. They drew soldiers from the Territorial Army and continued training for future conflicts on the horizon. In 1950, Britain committed to helping the UN to stop communist aggression on the Korean Peninsula. After three months of preparation, 21 SAS was given orders to Korea. During this same period, another problem arose in Malaya, which was administered by the British. The problem perfectly suited the Unit’s capabilities.

In 1948, communist guerillas began attacking British infrastructure and challenging British rule. These insurgents were a reconstituted arm of the local units that the British had trained to fight Japanese occupiers in WWII. The terrain and tactics of the guerillas were difficult to counter with conventional forces. Sabotage and hit and run operations began against the transportation system and the lucrative rubber plantations that were vital to Britain. The guerillas would come from the impenetrable jungle and disappear back into it.

The British had learned many valuable lessons in jungle warfare while fighting the Japanese in South East Asia. This training and experience still lived on in the commanders of the Malayan detachment. With forces being committed to the Korean conflict and the need for manpower worldwide, it was decided to make a recruiting drive for men in the colonies to try out for the SAS. So troops were raised to fill A Squadron and B Squadron, mainly from experienced British Territorials who had geared up for wartime deployment to Korea.

These forces would form the Malayan Scouts (the forefathers of the modern SAS) whose primary mission would be reconnaissance and the interdiction of the Communist Terrorists (CTs) along their known supply routes. It was a steep learning curve for the two squadrons and jungle illnesses took a brutal toll.

In Search of a Few Special Men

In 1951, Major “Mad Mike” Calvert, the expedition’s commanding officer, decided to take a trip to the far away African colony of Rhodesia. Rhodesia had contributed greatly in proportion to its population in WWII and a few Rhodesians had served in the SAS. Those younger Rhodesian men, who had felt that they had missed their chance to fight for the Crown due to their youth during the ‘Big One’, applied in droves. This caused quite a stir and the applications were capped at 1,000. These 1,000 applicants were carefully screened and 100, i.e.- the top 10 percent of men were chosen to be a part of the Malayan Scouts and the now resurrected SAS.

Once they were chosen, they underwent basic training and onto the general skills of an SAS Trooper by two Rhodesian veterans of World War Two, Lt. Peter Walls and Lt. Ron Campbell-Morrison. Both were combat experienced and expected to be replaced by a British commander once in-country. With great fanfare and a crowd of 3,000 people in Salisbury, the 100 were sent off to war. Upon arrival in the harsh jungle environment, they were faced with the reality of a hard-bitten counterinsurgency campaign. The Rhodesians would be C Squadron, the unit designation that would unknowingly stick with them far into the future ( now over 70 years for a temporary unit! ).

Their reception was not a welcome one but the men of the established A Squadron made an impression on the Rhodesian recruits. Yet, being highly motivated and unspoiled, they remained hearty and willing to get on with the mission at hand.

Into the Fire

As a small, self-contained and isolated unit is often prone to, there were disciplinary problems among A squadron. While the Rhodesians did a six-week workup, discipline was restored among the other men and several of them were sent packing. After the training course in the country, it was decided that the Rhodesians would not be split up nor have a British commander. Peter Walls would command C Squadron for the duration of the deployment. During the ‘yet to come’ Bush War- the existential battle for the life of their beloved Rhodesia – Lt. Walls would later become the Combined Operations Commander for the Rhodesian Army.

The young men had been chosen for their background and ability to work with a team in a harsh environment. Rhodesia was a breeding ground for excellent soldiers. Many of the men had grown up working hard on their family farms, playing Rugby and most importantly, hunting and tracking which developed a sixth sense needed in true Light Infantry combat. Tracking in Africa was an essential skill that could not be learned overnight. They found themselves having to learn to operate in unfamiliar terrain- the jungle instead of an open, sunlit battlespace. In the Rhodesian bush, the sun would light the tracks and give the tracker information by the shadows created. This made it easier to spot spoor, making for a quick assessment and pursuit. Among the men was a youngster by the name of Ron Reid-Daly. His upcoming learning experience would eventually help revolutionize counterinsurgency warfare with the formation of the Selous Scouts in the Bush War.

The canopy of the jungle blocked the sunlight causing the men to look for different spoor than they were accustomed to. The floor of the jungle was full of rotting vegetation and oftentimes the bush was so thick that machetes had to be used to move forward. The vegetation was as much their adversary as the CTs were.

Here, the lessons of Guerilla Warfare and Counter Insurgency, took root in the Rhodesian unit. This war would not allow for the entire squadron to hack through the jungle in open pursuit of the enemy. To do so would invite ambush and death. Small unit tactics were refined to a razor’s edge. Operating in small groups, from a four- to a 14-man patrol was the norm. The conventional doctrine taught that soldiers could operate for a maximum of seven days in the jungle. Yet, the SAS had other plans.

The enemies were not large in number but their native mastery of the jungle allowed them to a lesser jungle experienced army. C Squadron’s job was to locate the CTs, take their safe havens away and destroy their supplies, ambush their trails and avenues of escape and then drive them out of the bush and into the hands of more conventional and heavily armed units. This took patience and resolve. The SAS would often spend weeks at a time tracking and piecing together the intelligence that they developed. The helicopter, a new tactical tool, allowed the men to be inserted deep into enemy-held territory and hunt their prey with the resources they had. Heavy, advanced and technologically superior air assets and pinpoint artillery strikes were rarely, if ever involved. It was mano y mano warfare of wits and skill, from the officer down to the lowly troopie. Every gun ( gat ), every bullet, every step and each recce mattered.

Typically, a team would insert into an area believed to be near to or exactly in the home of a band of CTs and plot out the areas to recon, methodically searching behind every bush for information that would lead them to their objective. A base camp would be set up and from there men would be sent in four distinct directions to create a 360-degree search area. This might go on for days or weeks until they would find a trail or a camp. Once the enemy was located, they would devise an ambush plan. It was rare to make an outright assault due to the small number of operators. Their training in Navigation, Patrolling, Snap Shooting, and Ambush was being implemented with an ever-growing proficiency.

The fresh-faced lads that arrived in 1951 turned into Men of War, Jungle Fighters, and Soldiers of the Elite C Squadron of the SAS. Their reputation as solid SAS men grew among the British. For nearly two years the valiant “100” navigated, patrolled, and battled the Communist Terrs, building not only a reputation of a competent part of the SAS but soldiers to be feared. That experience would pay off in spades and quite frankly helped hold the Rhodesians together many years beyond what it should have against a numerically superior and supplied enemy in the coming decades.

Due to their skill, patience, and fortitude, they returned home in 1953 after nearly two years of combat with only three KIA. For his leadership in a merciless environment, Lt. Walls received the MBE, Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. More important than any medals or accolades that the British gave them was the fact that a foundation was created that Rhodesia could build an elite unit on par with the rest of the world. The unit was to battle the storm that was on the horizon in an increasingly fiery Communist superpower backed, trained and supplied war for Post-Colonial Africa.